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Article 2

Gary B. Melton*

Realism in Psychology and
Humanism in Law: Psycholegal
Studies at Nebraska
I. THE HISTORY OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
AT NEBRASKA
A.

The Growth of the Law/Psychology Program

This two-issue Symposium-the first Symposium on psychology
and law in any general law review-establishes another landmark in
the history of psychology and law at the University of Nebraska. In
1974, the first student entered the Law/Psychology Program (the "Nebraska Program"), the first such graduate training program. Since
then, the Nebraska Program has persisted as the largest and most diverse program in the field.
The Nebraska Program also remains on the cutting edge of the
psycholegal studies movement. 2 To some extent, this influence simply
reflects the scope of the Nebraska Program. In both breadth and
Carl Adolph Happold Professor of Psychology and Law, and Director of the aw/
Psychology Program and the Center on Children, Families, and the Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. BA., Virginia; MA., Ph.D., Boston Univ.
The Law/Psychology Program is supported in part by an institutional National Research Service Award from the National Institute of Mental Health
("NIMH")(Grant No. 5-T32-MH16156). The support for the Program by NIMH,
which has been continuous virtually since the Program's inception, is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See also 33 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL
INSTRUMENT (G. Melton ed. 1985)(invited symposium conducted during 1984-85,
the Law/Psychology Program's 10th-anniversary year). The Nebraska Symposium on Motivation is the oldest and most prestigious continuing symposium in
any field of psychology.
2. The Nebraska Program is generally recognized as the "reference point for the
development of any new programs" on psycholegal studies. PSYCHOLOGICAL ScIENCES SUBCOMM., MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH EDUCATION REvIEw COhm., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, SUMMARY STATEMENT ON THE
UNrvEsrTY OF NEBRASKA-LINCOLN PROGRAM ON MENTAL HEALTH POLICY AND

FORENsIc RESEARCH 2 (Feb. 26-28, 1986). Over the years, the Nebraska Program
has been the focus of numerous external evaluations by University-commissioned
panels (as part of periodic self-studies in the Department of Psychology and the
College of Law), various accrediting bodies, and peer review panels of the NIMH.
We have been fortunate to receive uniformly positive evaluations that have in-
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quantity of scholarship in psycholegal studies, the Nebraska Program
is unique. For example, the Program's influence and productivity
were strikingly illustrated at the last biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society ("AP-LS"),3 the major scholarly society
in the field. Although AP-LS has grown to nearly 1,700 members,
about 20% of the presentations at the meeting were made by scholars
4
connected with the Nebraska Program.
The Nebraska Program also is prominent in the governance of APLS. I am its president, and my colleague Alan Tomkins is a member
of the executive committee. Michael Saks, an adjunct faculty member
in the Program, is a past president as well as past editor of Law and
Human Behavior, the AP-LS journal. James Ogloff, the original editor of this Symposium and a recent graduate of our J.D.-Ph.D. program, is past student chair, and another student in the Nebraska
Program, Jessica Greenwald, is the current chair. The first director of
the Nebraska Program, Bruce Sales, is now the AP-LS representative
in the Council of Representatives of the American Psychological
5
Association.
The Nebraska Program's leading role in psycholegal studies, howcluded notice of the Nebraska Program's preeminent and pioneering status
among graduate training programs in psycholegal studies.
As an innovative effort to provide interdisciplinary training, the Nebraska
Program also has been the focus of several articles in the APA Monitor, the
monthly newspaper of the American Psychological Association. See, e.g., Fisher,
Nebraska Students Meld Science, Law and Politics, APA Monitor, Aug. 1986, at
14, col. 1; Moses, ProgramsBridge Law, Psychology, APA Monitor, Feb. 1990, at
38, col. 1; Wolinsky, ProgramsJoin "Distrustful"Disciplines,APA Monitor, Feb.
1982, at 15, col. 1.
3. Now a division of the American Psychological Association ("APA"), AP-LS formerly was a free-standing society, which retained its name after it merged with
the APA Division of Psychology and Law. Although now a division of APA, it
continues to welcome non-psychologists as members.
Consistent with that mixed structure, AP-LS holds annual meetings in conjunction with the APA convention, but AP-LS also holds an independent biennial
meeting. The most recent such biennial meeting was held in March 1990 in Williamsburg, Virginia.
4. A list of the presentations by individuals associated with the Nebraska Program
is provided in Appendix A. As discussed infra, the presentations by the Nebraska group were notable as much for their unconventional topics as for their
number.
5. Now a member of the psychology, law, and sociology faculties of the University of
Arizona, Professor Sales served as director of the Nebraska Program from its
inception until 1981. A past president of AP-LS, he also was founding editor of
Law and Human Behavior.
Dean Harvey Perlman long served as associate editor of Law and Human Behavior. I also have served in that role.
The national stature of the Nebraska Program also is illustrated by the honors
that have come to Program faculty. Professor Saks and I bath have been fortunate to receive APA's Award for Distinguished Contributions to Psychology in
the Public Interest, and Ross Thompson received the Boyd McCandless Award,
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ever, is not simply a matter of quantity.6 Indeed, examination of this

Symposium in the context of developments in the Nebraska Program
gives important clues to the evolution of psychology and law thus far
and to the potential of such studies as a foundation for realism in psychology and humanism in law-values that guide the Nebraska Program and underlie this Symposium.
Although the themes discussed in this Introduction do not exhaust
the list of the Nebraska Program's principal attributes, they do provide a glimpse of the approach that has distinguished the Nebraska
Program.7 Perhaps the most notable beginning point is that the Nebraska Program has found a hospitable home in a university in which
the APA Division of Developmental Psychology's award for distinguished early
career contributions.
6. The sheer size of the Nebraska Program does provide the educational equivalent
of an economy of scale so that we can offer a range of educational experiences
sufficient to ensure that students have access to the range of viewpoints and research directions in psycholegal studies. Besides offering a uniquely diverse array of psycholegal courses, the Nebraska Program sponsors a special colloquium
series and frequent invited symposia and institutes. The Nebraska Program also
serves as the hub of the Consortium on Children, Families, and the Law, which
enables students to work with leading interdisciplinary scholars at the Universities of Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, Pittsburgh, and Virginia, the State University of
New York, and various non-university-based centers (e.g., the Center on Children
and the Law of the American Bar Association). Combining those opportunities
with travel to various national professional meetings, students meet and hear
most of the leading scholars in psychology and law.
The Nebraska Program also is sufficiently large to form a "critical mass" of
colleagues that facilitates students' identification as "law/psych" scholars. See,
e.g., Otto, Heilbrun & Grisso, Trainingand Credentialingin ForensicPsychology,
8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 217 (1990), in which a former postdoctoral fellow in the Nebraska Program described "the most valuable part of the program to be involvement with a large number of individuals (fellows, graduate students, law faculty,
psychology faculty) with interests in the forensic area. Such an environment certainly fosters specialized study, research, and collaboration." 1d at 224.
7. In part as a result of our continuing efforts to evaluate and refine various aspects
of our training program, faculty and graduates of the Nebraska Program have
written numerous analyses of critical elements in training on various aspects of
psycholegal studies. See G. MELTON, L. WEITHORN & C. SLOBOGIN, COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH CENTERs AND THE CoURTs AN EVALUATION OF CoMMuNrrY-

BASED FORENsIc SERvicEs (1985)(evaluation of training for community mental
health professionals in forensic mental health services); Hafemeister, Ogloff &
Small, Trainingand Careersin Law and Psychology: The Perspectiveof Students
and Graduatesof Dual Degree Programs,8 BEHAv. SC. & L. 263 (1990); Levine,
Wilson & Sales, An Exploratory Assessment of APA Internships with Legal/brensicEperiences, 11 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 64 (1980); Melton, Trainingin Psychology and Law, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 681 (I. Weiner & A. Hess
eds. 1987); Melton, Monahan & Saks, Psychologists as Law Professors,42 AM. PsyCHOLOGIsT 502 (1987); Otto, Heilbrun & Grisso, supra note 6; Tomlins & Ogloff,
Training and Career Options in Psychology and Law, 8 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 205
(1990). For a comprehensive discussion of the curriculum, see G. Melton, Training in Mental Health Policy (Sept. 6,1990) (application to the National Institute of
Mental Health for competing continuation funding of the Program).
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both the College of Law and the Department of Psychology have a
tradition of problem-centered scholarship and training responsive to
state and national needs and relatively unconstrained by disciplinary
and subdisciplinary boundaries.8
It is not clear that the development of psychology and law at Nebraska has been linear; one phase has not obviously evolved into another, and the stream of development has been more intermittent
than continuous, at least when that process is examined across decades. Nonetheless, that Nebraska has been a site of innovation in
psycholegal and sociolegal studies since the earliest days of such work
suggests an ongoing receptivity to interdisciplinary scholarship in the
public interest. 9
8. The Department of Psychology at Nebraska, which celebrated its centennial last
year, is one of the oldest departments in the United States, and it contributed
heavily to the development of the discipline in the late 19th and early 20th centu-

ries. See Benjamin, A Teacher is Forever. The Legacy of Harry Kirke Wolfe
(1858-1918), 14 TEACHING OF PSYCHOLOGY 68 (1987); Benjamin & Bertelson, The

Early NebraskaPsychology Laboratory,1889-1930: Nurseryfor Presidentsof the
American PsychologicalAssociation, 11 J. HIST. BEHAv. Sci. 142 (1975).
In the past two decades, the department has fostered innovative programs for
graduate education not only in psycholegal studies but also on other topics of
social concern that cross disciplines and subdisciplines of psychology, such as alcoholism, behavior toxicology, and rural mental health. See, e.g., Hargrove, Train-

ing for Rural Mental Health Service Delivery: A Report from Nebraska, COMMUNITY MENT. HEALTH J. - (forthcoming); Hargrove, Fox & Goldman, Recruitmen Motivation, and Reinforcement of Preprofessionalsfor Public Sector
Mental Health Careers,-

COmmu=Y MENT. HEALTH J. -

(forthcoming); Har-

grove & Howe, Trainingin Rural Mental Health Delivery: A Response to Priori.
tized Needs, 12 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 722 (1981); Hargrove & Spaulding, Training

Psychologistsfor Work with the ChronicallyMentally 111, 24 COmmuNITY MENT.
HEALTH J. 283 (1988); Howe, Ph.D.Psychology Trainingfor Rural Mental Health
The University of Nebraska-LincolnProgram, in TRANNG PROFESSIONALS FOR
RURAL MENTAL HEALTH 90 (H. Dengerink & H. Cross eds. 1982); Rivers & Cole,

The Alcohol TrainingSpeciality in Community-ClinicalPsychology, 7 PROF. PsYCHOLOGY 202 (1976).
9. One of the remarkable aspects of legal education has been that, although there
have been ebbs and flows in interdisciplinary emphasis in the field as a whole,
there has been substantial consistency in the law schools that have tended to lean
toward an identity as academic institute more than professional school and, even
more specifically, toward openness to academic study of the law from the perspective of multiple disciplines. See R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL LEGAL EDUCATION
IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s To THE 1980S (1983); Melton, Monahan & Saks, supra

note 7; Schlegel, American Legal Realism and EmpiricalSocial Science: From
the Yale Eaperience,28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979). Although the factors that
maintain such traditions are not clear, it is unlikely that they are purely random.
Sociohistorical analysis of such issues might provide some clarifications that
would prevent the necessity of seemingly perpetual debate over the place of the
arts and sciences in the law curriculum; see R. STEVENS, supra; Bergin, The Law
Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637 (1968). In legal
academia in the 1980s, the brouhaha over the suggestions by Harvard President
and former Law Dean Derek Bok that law schools should emphasize empirical
study of the legal system was clearly reminiscent of the debates within the facul-
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Sociological Jurisprudence

The beginning of law and social science at Nebraska--and, for that
matter, in legal academia as a whole, to a large extent-must begin
with Roscoe Pound. Although much of his most important work on
sociologicaljurlsprudencewas conducted after he departed Nebraska
for Harvard, Dean Pound surely serves as patron saint for psycholegal
and sociolegal studies at Nebraska. He laid the foundation for much of
the "law and... ." scholarship that has been commonplace in legal
academia in the past two decades. In effect, Pound sought to humanize the law-to move the law beyond a "mechanical jurisprudence"0
to a greater sensitivity to the human dilemmas that the law is intended to address. Pound's own summary of the central problem of
sociological jurisprudence was "to enable and to compel law-making,
and also interpretation and application of legal rules, to take more account, and more intelligent account, of the social facts upon which law
must proceed and to which it must be applied.""
In admonitions that unfortunately still have much to say to some
jurists, Pound sought to destroy the legal fictions that are used to rationalize unjust social ordering.12 He based his jurisprudence on a progressive view of law as a "social institution which may be improved by
intelligent human effort" and a normative view that judges and legal
scholars have a "duty to discover the best means of furthering and
directing such effort" in the service of "the social purposes which law
ties of major law schools in the realist era. See Bok, A Flawed System of Law
Practiceand Training,33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 570 (1983).
10. Pound, Liberty of Contract,18 YALE L.J. 454, 462 (1909).
11. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurspnudence,25 HARV. L. REV.

489, 512-13 (1912).
12. In his critique of realist jurisprudence, Pound began by acknowledging the significance of realism as "fidelity to nature, accurate recording of things as they are, as
contrasted with things as they are imagined to be, or wished to be, or as one feels
they ought to be" and as "faithful adherence to the actualities of the legal order
as the basis of a science of law." Pound, The Callfora Realist Jurisprudence,44
HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1931).
As I have noted elsewhere, an unfortunate tendency by some jurists even today is to justify limitations on rights of disadvantaged groups by behavioral assumptions derived from ideology about the way that the social order ought to be,
without regard to contrary empirical evidence. See, eg., Melton, The Clashingof
Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 345 (1987).
In a manner reminiscent of the institutionalized unreality that the sociological
jurisprudes and the realists criticized nearly a century ago, such myths can assume a life of their own through the application of the principle of stare decisis to
the erroneous assumptions themselves. See Perry & Melton, PrecedentialValue
of JudicialNotice of Social Factsv Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAm. L. 633
(1984). Cf Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,Evaluating,and
EstablishingSocial Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (1986)(arguing that
judicial findings about social reality should be treated like law for purposes of
introduction of social science research, review by appellate courts, and consideration by subsequent and inferior courts).
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subserves."1S Empirical observation (e.g., scholarship on factors affecting judicial decision making) was perceived as neither a goal. in
itself nor merely a means of debunking the law. Rather, it was viewed
by Pound as a tool for promoting social welfare' 4 through discovery of
values particularly important for the law to protect 15 and experimentation to identify ways that the law might more fully achieve its
purposes. 16
C.

Experimental Jurisprudence

Although Pound's work is classic, Nebraska has had other interdisciplinary forays that are less well known. Notably, sociological jurisprudence served as the foundation for a brief but far-reaching
embrace of experimental jurispradence, a jurisprudential approach
championed by Frederick Beutel,17 who served as dean when the College of Law reopened after World War II. Dean Beutel perceived the
quality of legal scholarship to be determinable by "a pragmatic test of
their actual workings in everyday life," without regard to underlying
philosophy.' 8 Consistent with that view, Beutel regarded every legal
decision to be an experiment "where the methods of trial and error
must prevail."19 Moreover, to maximize the likelihood of a practical
success, Beutel believed that social scientific methods should
predominate in legal inquiry.20
In keeping with Beutel's ideas about the proper role of the law in
society, the entire curriculum of the College of Law was reshaped to
increase students' appreciation of the utility of empirical analyses of
13. Pound, supra note 11, at 516.
14. In a passage prescient of current critiques of the law and economics movement,
see Melton, Law, Science, and Humanity: The Normative Foundation of Social
Science in Law, 14 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 315 (1990), Pound criticized some
branches of the realist movement for espousing "the entrepreneur attitude toward law" and seemingly promoting the interests of business without regard to
their relation to the broader social welfare. Pound, supra note 12, at 708.
15. Pound argued that realism should include "[a] theory of interests [and a parallel
theory of values] and of the ends of the legal order based on or consistent with
modern psychology." Pound, supra note 12, at 711. He believed that psychology,
then in its infancy, would illuminate the way that values develop in a culture and
are expressed through law. Pound, supra note 11, at 503-09.
16. Pound, supra note 11, at 515.
17. See F. BEUTEL, DEMocRAcy OR THE SCiENTIFc METHOD IN LAw AND POLICY
MAKING (1965); F. BEUTEL, EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SCIENSTATE
(1975) [hereinafter F. BEUTEL, SCIENSTATE]; Beutel, Some Implications of Eaperi.
mental Jurisprudence,48 HARV. L. REv. 169 (1934) [hereinafter Beutel, Some
Implications].
18. Beutel, Some Implications,supra note 17, at 178.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., id. at 195-97.
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the social consequences of legal decisions.21 Although Nebraska ultimately returned to a traditional curriculum, contemporary analysis of
legal education described the postwar Nebraska curriculum as "extending... well beyond that of any other school" in its attention to
"problems of the body politic." 22
Beutel extended the work of the realists and the sociological jurisprudes in two ways. First, he recognized the importance of modern
social science methodology as a means for fulfillment of the desire for
knowledge about the actual effects of the law and the legal system.
The "social engineering" that Pound and others espoused early in the
century really was more social work than social science. The sociological jurisprudes were concerned with the general goal of fitting law to
social reality, but, as was understandable given the infancy of the social sciences, they gave relatively little scrutiny to the methodological
problems in doing so. Although Beutel was not as skeptical as he
should have been about the limits of scientific inquiry, he did pioneer a
recognition of the significance of the adoption of experimental methods in the social sciences as applied to law.23
Second, Beutel defined post-New Deal areas of law that benefit
from a social-scientific analysis. By the time that he assumed the Nebraska deanship, realism had waned as an independent force in legal
scholarship. Although the reasons for the decline were multiple,24 at
least one was that most of the movement's goals had been achieved.
The notion that judges are influenced by social and political reality
had become so well accepted as to be trivial, and the New Deal ideals
that guided the realists had been reified in a vast program of social
welfare legislation. 25 Beutel followed that development to what may
have been its logical conclusion: an emphasis on the application of scientific methods in the development and implementation of legislation
and regulations.2 6
21. See Beutel, The New Curriculumat the UniversityofNebraskaCollege ofLaw, 25

NEB. L. REV.177 (1946).
22. E. BRowN, LAwYERs, LAW ScHooLs AND THE PUBLIc SERvicE 217 (1948). For a
detailed account of the evolution of legal education in response to sociologicaljurisprudential and realist developments, see R. STEVENS, supra note 9.
23. See, ag., F. BEUTEL, ScIENSTATE, supra note 17, at 68-69.
24. J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SocrL SCIENCE iN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 21,

27 (2d ed. 1990).
25. The sociological jurisprudence and realist movements were heavily entwined
with Progressivism and the New Deal, respectively. White, From Sociological
Jurisprudenceto Realism.. Jurisprudenceand Social Changein Early TwentiethCentury America, 58 VA. L. REV.999 (1972). Law school curricula were permanently altered to take into account the new realms of public law, and some of the
faculty teaching the new courses had been instrumental in drafting and implementing the legislation that was the foci of such courses. R. STEVENS, supranote
9, at 159-60.
26. F. BEUTEL, SCiENSTATE, supra note 17, at 278-361. Beutel's emphasis on public
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Despite these contributions, Beutel's influence was short-lived, apparently because of his dogmatic approach to science and law.27 Beutel failed to appreciate--and even exaggerated-the realists' confusion
of ought and is and their lack of care in analysis of the moral underpinnings of the law. He believed that problems of values are unimportant,2 8 and he failed to recognize that his own "scientific" conclusions
often were themselves normative rather than empirical. 29 He also rejected traditional values out of hand without examination of their
merit.3 0 In short, Beutel sought to elevate the scientific method as the
end rather than a means, and to strip the law of any meaning beyond
its effect.3 '
law was reflected in his reform of the Nebraska law curriculum. Beutel, supra
note 21.
Perhaps ironically, current social science in law has moved away from the emphasis on administrative process to a concern with judicial assumptions in constitutional law and in interpretation of related statutory developments (eg., civil
rights statutes). See generally J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 24.
27. F. BEUTEL, SCMNSTATE, supra note 17, begins with an apparently bitter but telling self-appraisal by Beutel:
Because this book deprecates the place of religion, the common law,
and democracy (the "sacred cows" of Anglo-American polity) in the
proper structure of government, and since it reduces political ideals (values) to their rightful place as unproven hypotheses, it was impossible to
get it sponsored in the United States either by endowed university
presses or by commercial publishers. It has therefore been necessary to
have it published in Germany where the intellectual climate is more
favorable to the growth of science.

Id at 10.
28. See, e.g., Beutel, Some Implications,supra note 17, at 179 ("The ethical problem
of what is the ultimate good, although it may eventually become one of the
problems of jurisprudence, is today too far removed to require consideration").
29. See, eg., id. at 191 ("Any legal system which places over ninety per cent of the
world's goods in the hands of less than thirteen per cent of the population of a
new country, without regard to intelligence, ability, or social benefits to be derived therefrom, and which requires the destruction of materials for food and
clothing when seventy-five per cent of the population is living below a decent
standard of comfort, has little to recommend it to the scientific jurist")(footnotes

omitted).
30. See &g., id. at 185 ("Scientific jurisprudence can have little to say for constitutions; like codes, they are an attempt of the dead past to bind the future"). With a
footnote arguing for eugenic measures to prevent the reproduction of the "lower
classes" at a rate much more rapid than the "more intelligent," Beutel urged outright rejection of "old-fashioned morality":
As long as these [legal] ideals are based upon tradition, folk lore of former generations, religion, mysticism, and even blind prejudice, they cannot be trusted as a basis for law. Laws growing out of such ideals are
likely to run counter to new developments in science which are creating
profound changes in the social structure. Statutes or judgments enacting
the morals of yesterday may encourage or force anti-social practices today which threaten the welfare of the race of tomorrow.
Id, at 189 (footnotes omitted).
31. See, e.g., id at 181 ("A scientific jurisprudence would demand that the bandage be
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Social Science in Law

Although Beutel's work was not sufficiently influential to characterize his approach as underlying a "movement," the Nebraska flirtation with experimental jurisprudence was one of the few systematic
efforts to integrate law and social science during the postwar period.
As law schools gathered funds to educate returning military veterans
to be legal practitioners, empirical research was not a high priority. 2
Social science began to make its way back into law schools in the
1960s with the demand for "relevancy" in the curriculum. Somewhat
curiously, though, the response-what is often termed the law and society movement 33-- was minimally applied, perhaps because the standard for relevancy was necessarily outside the law itself. Developing
coincident with a myriad of other interdisciplinary ("law and . . .")
efforts initiated in the 1960s and 1970s,3 4 the law and society movement (institutionalized in the Law and Society Association) has been
disproportionately led by law professors (rather than sociologists, anthropologists, or political scientists), who typically have taken the perspective of outsiders looking in. Accordingly, they have used socialscientific rather than legal theories to frame research questions, and
they have examined the legal system as social scientists might study
any other institution.3 5

32.
33.
34.

35.

stripped from the eyes of the courts, and that they be supplied with a complete
staff of research experts to enlighten them on the real interests involved.") and
187 ("It is not surprising that in the eyes of many scientists the art of the legal
profession today rises little higher than that of the osteopath, the astrologer, the
hypnotist, or phrenologist, and that the wise business man stays as far as possible
from the judicial process").
See J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 24.
See Friedman, The Future of Law and Social Sciences Research, 52 N.C.L. REv.
1068 (1974); Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763
(1986).
An interesting view of these developments was offered by Richard Posner in a
sometimes acerbic Article in the centennial issue of the HarvardLaw Review.
Posner, The Decline ofLaw as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv.
L. REV. 761 (1987). Of course, Judge Posner is widely known for his devotion to
the most influential of the recent "law and..." movements-law and economics.
See, eg., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1983). In that regard, he
has tested interdisciplinary efforts for their utility in legal decision making, an
approach similar in method if not necessarily in ideology to the perspective taken
by participants in the social science in law movement. Posner also has taken a
stance similar to that of the older law and society movement, though, in another
of his prolific forays into interdisciplinary scholarship. In his work on law and
literature,Posner has exhibited a rich interest in purely academic study of the
law, with only tangential concern for applied benefit (in application of literary
methods to analysis of the meaning of legal texts). See, eg., R. POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
Followers of the law and society movement generally have denigrated the significance of the behavioral issues in the law in favor of basic scholarship on the nature of law, apart from the law's own need for social-science knowledge. Malcolm

260
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In its purest form, the law and society approach is basic social science; the law is merely a new laboratory for the investigation of social
theory. Even when they have interests that are applied, law and society scholars generally disregard the doctrinal premises on which the
law is founded. Rather, they test the congruence of the law in action
with theories of social action derived in other spheres.
By contrast, most well formulated psycholegal studies-certainly
most of those conducted at Nebraska 3 6-- have been explicitly applied
endeavors that have been framed in the perspective of the law; such
work is social science in law. As I have summarized elsewhere:
the social science in law (SSL) perspective has been the product primarily of
social scientists in law schools-in a sense, outsiders on the inside of legal
academia. More precisely, the articulation of SSL has been the product of
such scholars. As a practical matter, SSL has grown truly outside the legal
system in the laboratories of social scientists who have sought to test the behavioral and social assumptions that underlie the formulation or application
of legal doctrine. To do their work, such scientists necessarily have taken an
insider's perspective to discover the empirical issues that are critical to legal
policy.
Consistent with that approach, most theoretical scholarship in SSL has
been aimed at identifying social-scientific questions in the law and determining the most effective means of presenting the relevant research findings to
legal decision makers. To a large extent, "most effective" has been conceptualized pragmatically as the means most consonant with accepted principles of
the law of evidence and procedure. 37
Feely, director of the Center for the Study of Law and Society at the University
of California, Berkeley, has provided a particularly frank statement of a lack of
concern with the psychosocial problems posed by the law itself:
Like the family, religion, the market, and politics, law is an ubiquitous
institution, found everywhere through time and across all cultures. As
one of the great forms of social ordering, it is worthy of study in the same
ways these other great institutions are. Its universality, its appeal, its
endurance all serve to make it an important subject in a liberal arts curriculum dedicated to exploring humankind's enduring institutions.
By this I do not mean to suggest that the law is the crowning glory of
civilization which must be celebrated uncritically. Rather I believe that
law, as a universal form of social ordering, merits a prominent place in
the liberal arts curriculum. Law is too importanta cultural institution
to be left to the law schools, whose goals are professional training rather
than cultural understanding.
Feely, FeaturingLaw in the LiberalArts Curriculum, 5 Focus ON L. STuD. 1, 1
(1990)(emphasis added).
36. Most psycholegal research at Nebraska has been focused on behavioral assumptions in the law or on the use of social science in the law. See infra § H and
Appendixes A and B.
37. Melton, Law, Science, and Humanity: The Normative Foundationof Social Science in Law, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315, 320 (1990)(citations omitted). The social science in law perspective has been articulated most comprehensively by
Professors John Monahan, a legally sophisticated psychologist, and Laurens
Walker, a psychologically sophisticated lawyer, of the University of Virginia
School of Law, in a casebook, J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 24, and a
trilogy of important articles on various types of social science evidence, Monahan
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Because SSL scholarship has been so clearly applied in its focus, its
underlying philosophy has not been well developed. I have argued,
however, that
SSL is based on a coherent moral vision that is consonant with its realist heritage but that also draws on the deontological underpinnings of postrealist
legal philosophy .... Like their realist progenitors, SSL scholars appear to
share a commitment to the promotion of social welfare and beliefs that the
law is a useful means to that goal, that the law is reformable, and that social
science can assist the law in its mission.38

SSL scholarship extends realist contributions by application of better
developed social science methods in the context of case law and legal
scholarship that is respectful of fundamental moral values (e.g., auton39
omy, privacy, and equality).
E.

Psychological Jurisprudence

In recent years, psycholegal scholars at Nebraska have begun to
build on the foundation provided by an SSL approach to establish a
4
psychologicaljurisprudence.
The assumption underlying such work
& Walker, supranote 12; Walker & Monahan, Social Fact" ScientificMethodology as Legal Precedent,76 CALiF. L. REV. 877 (1988); Walker & Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of SocialScience in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). The
arguments presented in these works were summarized succinctly in Monahan &
Walker, Social Science Research in Law: The Arguments PresentedA New Paradigm, 43 AM. PsYcHoLoGIST 465 (1988). See also W. LoH, SOcIAL RESEARCH IN
THE JUDICIAL PRocEss (1984)(casebook examining use of social science in law);
Melton, Monahan & Saks, supra note 7, at 502 (discussion of the expanding role
of psychologists in law as a result of change in the jurisprudential foundation of
their work).
38. Melton, supra note 37, at 321 (citation omitted).
39. Id at 321-22.
40. Several of my own articles have served as initial explorations of psychological
jurisprudence. E.g., Melton, supra note 37; Melton, Taking GaultSeriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REv. 146 (1989); Melton, The Signficance
ofLaw in the Everyday Lives of Childrenand Families,22 GA. L. REV. 851 (1988)
[hereinafter Melton, Significance];Melton & Saks, The Law as an Instrument of
Socialization and Social Structure, in 33 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION: THE LAW
AS A BEHAviORAL INsTRumENT 235 (1985). A recent doctoral dissertation in the

Nebraska Program applied the perspective to an empirical and conceptual analysis of the nature of privacy interests. M. Small, The Role of Perceptions of Privacy in a Psychology of Jurisprudence (1990). See also Tremper, Respect for the

Human Dignity of Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L.

REV. 1293 (1988); Tremper & Kelly, The Mental HealthRationaleforPoliciesFostering Minors' Autonomy, 10 INTL J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 111 (1987)(articles by
then-faculty member in the Nebraska Program showing the psychological significance of legal protection of human dignity in childhood and adolescence).

The significance of a psychological-jurisprudential perspective was examined-not always with complete favor-in a symposium at the meeting of the
APA in Boston in August 1990. All of the participants had connections with the
Nebraska Program. D. Fox, The Autonomy-Community Balance and the EquityLaw Distinction (former postdoctoral fellow in the Program); M. Small, The
Need for a Psychology of Jurisprudence (recent graduate of the J.D.-Ph.D. pro-

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:251

has been that the best (i.e., most useful) psycholegal research is that
which informs legal policymakers about behavioral questions that are
relevant to the application of fundamental values.
This perspective has been enhanced by analysis of the contributions that psychology might make in the resolution of classical jurisprudential problems. Specifically, Professor Saks and I urged that
studies be undertaken to determine what the law means subjectively,
how that meaning is acquired, and how the law shapes the behavior of
individuals, groups, and communities. 41 In other words, a psychology
of jurisprudence would describe and explain the phenomenology of
law, socialization into the law, and socialization by the law. Insofar as
the behavioral effects of the law are symbolic, 42 there is a delicate interplay among these topics; the law both reflects and sustains the
norms of the community. Therefore, the law should "work" best
when positive and intuitive law are congruent.
These observations about the psychology of law suggested the utility of a psychological jurisprudence. Psychology may illuminate the
nature of law by identifying, for example, the relationship between
legal events and perceived justice. More profoundly, psychology may
indicate the conditions most conducive to development and preservation of human dignity and the values related to it. 43 Similarly, by clarifying the variables that affect legal socialization, psychology may
assist legal policymakers to develop settings and promote policies that
enhance the development of democratic values.
Put into such a framework, SSL scholars' tests of the behavioral
assumptions in the law can be understood as one element of a broader
gram); J. Snowden, The Greedy and the Not-So-Greedy: Tribal Law (faculty colleague at Nebraska); R. Wiener, Psycholegal Jurisprudence: The Foundation of
an Emerging Paradigm (former postdoctoral fellow in the Program and recipient
of M.L.S. degree from Nebraska). Professor Saks and I served as discussants.
The papers from the APA symposium are being developed into a special issue of
Behavioral Science and the Law.
41. Melton & Saks, supra note 40, at 268.
42. We argued that the law's most acute effects on behavior occur through its function as a moral educator. Id. at 251-63. The law is a system of social cues that
guide the behavior of those who are motivated to adhere to community norms-most people-irrespective of the carrots or sticks that the law promises to provide: "Law teaches the moral and social norms of the community and, in a sense,
announces, reiterates, and indeed ritualizes the myths and themes of the culture." Id. at 251.
43. Psychological jurisprudence views the promotion of human dignity as the actual
primary goal of the law and the goal that the law should have, and it posits empirical psychological study as the optimal method of illuminating the conditions that
are conducive to a sense of dignity. This constellation is analogous to the mixture
of empirical, normative, and methodological attention to promotion of efficiency
(maximization of wealth) embedded in legal economics. I have little doubt of the
greater nobility of the psychological as compared to the economic perspective in
regard to their organizing principles. See generally Melton, supra note 37.
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mission of "assist[ance] in the fulfillment of the values fundamental in
Western law and moral philosophy by identifying basic human concerns and testing the assumptions that limit the application of historic
legal principles."44 Through continual evaluations of the behavioral
assumptions (ie., statements of legislative intent in the exercise of
state interests, whether by legislators or judges) that might limit personhood and the rights corollary to it, psycholegal scholars "can expose myths that falsify . . . experience . . . and provide ruses for
protection of a social order inconsistent with legal ideals."45 Such inquiry should result in increased attention by the law to the most significant aspects of our lives (both subjectively and normatively) as
individuals and members of families and communities, illumination of
unjustified limitations on fundamental rights, and identification of effective means of vindicating such rights.46 At the same time, psychological jurisprudence should drive psychology itself toward greater
consideration of the most fundamental aspects of human experiencegreater realism in psychological study and greater humanism in law.47
II. THE IMPACT OF THE NEBRASKA PROGRAM
As the review thus far illustrates, the jurisprudential theories underlying psycholegal scholarship have moved toward increasingly fundamental concerns in the law. Unfortunately, psycholegal research
itself often has not been so sensitive to the psychological questions in
the law. Rather than starting with an analysis of the behavioral assumptions in the law, psychologists too often have attempted to increase the social relevance of their work by redefining traditional lines
of psychological research as "legal." Therefore, psycholegal research
often has seemed to be intended to illuminate merely the psychology
of juries (small groups) and eyewitnesses (perception and memory).4 s
To compound the folly, such research often has seemed to lack the
44. Id. at 322.

45. Id This concern is remarkably similar to that voiced by Pound three-quarters of
a century ago. See supra note 12.
46. Melton, supra note 37, at 329.
47. The perspective that I have advocated is "bottom-up." From such a perspective,
domains of law are defined as citizens in various social contexts perceive them,
and the focus of analysis is everyday experience. See, e.g., Melton, Signizwnce,
supranote 40. For jurisprudential analyses undertaken from vantage points similar to my own, see T. DAHL, WOMEN's LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST JuRIsPrUDENCE (R Craig trans. 1987); Nader, A User Theory of Legal Change as
Applied to Gender,in 33 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIvATIoN: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL
INSTRUMENT (G. Melton ed. 1985).
48. The narrowness of much psycholegal research was graphically illustrated by an
examination of submissions to Law and Human Behavior,the leading journal in
the field. Saks, The Law Does Not Live by Eyewitness Testimony Alone, 10 LAw
& HUM. BEHAV. 279 (1986).
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most fundamental accommodations to external validity.49
Since its inception, researchers in the Nebraska Program have
been committed to development of an empirical knowledge base relevant to important questions of legal policy. Examination of the topics
of doctoral dissertations that have been written by graduates of the
Nebraska Program (Appendix B) and of recent scholarship discussed
at professional meetings (e.g., Appendix A) shows little of the triviality of focus that has been common within the field of psychology and
law; eyewitness testimony and jury research are largely absent.
Rather, the research conducted by students in the Nebraska Program
generally has been one of three types: assessment of the impact of
legal reform (essentially, examining whether the goals of legislators
and litigators have been fulfilled); evaluation of behavioral assumptions in the law; or determination of the factors affecting use of social
science in law. Most of the recent research has been within the latter
two categories. In short, contemporary psycholegal research at Nebraska is similar in content to the agenda that Pound established early
in the century for sociological jurisprudence: to discover "the actual
social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines,"50 to determine
"means of making legal rules effective,"51 and to develop an approach
49. In social science jargon, ezternal validity refers to the generalizability of research
findings to the real world. Internalvalidity refers to the degree that alternative
explanations for findings are ruled out by the research design. See generally T.
COOK &

D.

CAMPBELL, QUASI-ExPERMENTATION:

DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES

FOR FIELD SErriN s (1979).
Psycholegal research has been criticized with some justification for failing to
preserve even the rudiments of the legal process in research that is supposed to,
for example, simulate the trial process. Kone~ni & Ebbesen, EWrnal Validity of
Research in Legal Psychology, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1979). Criticism of the
choice of research topics on the ground of legal triviality, see J. MONAHAN & L.
WALKER, supra note 24, is in the same genre.
Although some criticism of the external validity of psycholegal research
clearly is justified, it is important also to note that even in the "overresearched"
areas of eyewitness and jury research, the external validity of research has increased dramatically in recent years. See generally V. HANS & N. VWMAR, JUDGING TIHE JURY (1986); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON

TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTrVES (1988). For example, in our own research
on the effects of adding a guilty but mentally ill ("GBMI") option in insanity
cases, the stimulus is a videotaped professional reenactment of an actual trial
with the full panoply of instructions. Mock jurors are chosen from the jury pool,
and they have the opportunity to see the videotape and then to deliberate in realistic mock-courthouse settings. (Martin Gardner, Daniel Wolfe, and Ruthann
Macolini have collaborated with me in the GBMI study, which has been supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health.)
In that context, some jurists have established standards for use of social science research that belie a desire to ignore social reality more than to exercise due
care in consideration of social-scientific evidence. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
50. Pound, supra note 11, at 513.
51. Id. at 514.
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to legal decision making that will result in "reasonable and just solutions of individual causes." 52
The Nebraska Program has been typified not only by careful interdisciplinary scholarship on topics of legal significance but also by equal
care in the diffusion of behavioral science research and theory among
policymakers. Faculty members in the Nebraska Program frequently
provide briefings to Congressional staff, consult to administrators and
legislators in state governments around the country, serve on task
forces of relevant professional organizations, provide expert testimony, prepare amicus briefs, and provide background information for
mass media and community groups. To facilitate such interaction and
to ensure that the form and forum for communication of psycholegal
research are optimal for such interaction, faculty members in the Nebraska Program have studied the process of knowledge diffusion in
the legal system, 53 and they use that information for systematic application of research within various groups of legal policymakers and
practitioners.
Consistent with the philosophy of the Nebraska Program and the
education that takes place in both the generation and diffusion of legally relevant, socially significant research, most graduates of the Nebraska Program work in settings that are conducive to such efforts
(see Table 1). Besides accumulating impressive records of scholarship
while in graduate and law school, most graduates have been successful
in interdisciplinary work. Many are in public service, and still more
are in academia. Of those in academia, though, most are in interdisciplinary programs where their work continues to be psycholegal in content, to focus on problems of substantial legal and social significance,
and to involve active dissemination and leadership efforts.
TABLE 1
EMPLOYMENT OF GRADUATES OF THE LAW/
PSYCHOLOGY PROGRAM
Place of Employment

Track"

J.D.-Ph.D.

Ph.D.-M.L.S.

J.D.-M.A.

Total

Academia
Private research centers
Public serviced

6
3
7

10
0
4

5
1
2

21
4
13

Private practice'

3

0

5

8

Total
19
14
13
46f
*This table includes "all-but-dissertation" students who have full-time professional
employment.

52. Id at 515.
53. See, eg., REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH (G.
Melton ed. 1987); Melton, Bringing Psychology to the Legal System- Opportunities, Obstacles, and Ffficacy, 42 AM. PsYcHOLOGisT 488 (1987).
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b Students

and fellows who completed the equivalent of the M.L.S. degree (generally
before that degree became available) are listed within the 'Ph.D.-M.L.S." track.
Analogously, lawyers who were postdoctoral fellows within the Program before the
Psychology Department began awarding an M.A. for their work are counted as "J.D.
M.A." graduates.
Some graduates of the J.D.-M.A. program entered the Law/Psychology Program with
the intention of earning a Ph.D. degree, but they elected instead to obtain a terminal
M.A.
cAll but five of these graduates are in interdisciplinary departments or centers or in
joint appointments. Most of the remaining graduates (two J.D.-Ph.D.s and two Ph.D.M.L.S.s) have sole appointments in psychology departments, but all do interdisciplinary
teaching. One graduate (a J.D.-Ph.D.) is a law professor.
d Several graduates now working in other settings formerly were employed as clerks or
staff in courts or legislatures. Two J.D.-Ph.D.s and three J.D.-M.A.s were clerks to
appellate judges. Two J.D.-Ph.D.s were congressional fellows, and one former postPh.D. fellow was a staff member in the Oklahoma legislature. Two other graduates (a
J.D.-M.A. and a J.D.-Ph.D. student who is working on his dissertation) are now
employed as staff in the Nebraska legislature and are counted in this row.
Other settings in which graduates currently are public servants include the Civil
Rights Division of the U. S. Justice Department (one J.D.-Ph.D.), a protection and
advocacy agency for people with mental disabilities (one J.D.-Ph.D.), a state court
administrator's office (one J.D.-Ph.D.), court clinics (one J.D.-Ph.D. and one Ph.D.M.L.S.), mental health/mental retardation/substance abuse planning offices (two J.D.Ph.D.s and one J.D.-M.A.), a correctional mental health unit (one Ph.D.-M.L.S.), a
domestic violence program (one Ph.D.-M.L.S.), and a Veterans Administration hospital
(one Ph.D.-M.L.S.). Several of these positions (those in planning offices and the court
administrator's office) have applied research (generally a mixture of empirical and legal
research) as their primary function.
*One J.D.-Ph.D.'s practice is predominantly in clinical psychology, although with an
emphasis on consultation to attorneys. The remaining graduates in private practice are
in medium- or large-firm law practice.
fTwo graduates are not included in this table. One recent graduate who recently
completed a judicial clerkship (a J.D.-M.A.) has not yet accepted a permanent position.
Another graduate (a J.D.-Ph.D.) is deceased. Therefore, the correct N for graduates and
"almost graduates" of the Law/Psychology Program is 48.

III. THIS SYMPOSIUM IN JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT
This Symposium is a fitting complement to the achievements of the
Nebraska Program's faculty, students, and graduates. For the most
part, the Articles in this issue of the Symposium fit well within the
evolving tradition of psycholegal scholarship. Although several of the
Articles challenge prevailing behavioral assumptions in the law, those
challenges are in the service of the law's own stated purposes. As a
group, they demonstrate a sensitivity to the potential of the law in
building and reflecting a sense of community and in protecting human
dignity, and they offer often elegant examples of the potential value of
psychological inquiry in fulfilling that potential.
Moreover, the breadth of topics examined illustrates the wide
range of legal issues involving behavioral assumptions, even if psychologists of law themselves often have been slow to move beyond
traditional psycholegal topics related to the criminal justice and
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mental health systems. As such, this Symposium may stand as a turning point in the development of psycholegal studies.
Two of the Articles in the Symposium-both on non-traditional
topics-are creative applications of a psychological-jurisprudential
framework, in which subjective understanding of legal constructs is
used to guide the development of the law. Moving adroitly into an
area of law that psychologists have largely ignored, Valerie Hans
shows how intuitive views of morality can serve as a foundation for
defining legal standards relating to corporate responsibility.5 4 Richard Wiener, a former postdoctoral fellow in the Nebraska Program,
applies a similar analysis to the role of the law as a moral educator in a
domain (medical malpractice) in which symbolic effects of law seldom
have been considered.5 5 Starting from an assumption that the law
serves in part to educate the community about prevailing social norms,
Professor Wiener examines the potential of malpractice law in promoting individual cognitive representations of standards of practice
and, in so doing, inculcating desired norms of professional behavior.
Besides applying contemporary psycholegal analysis, Wiener also follows a more traditional approach in realist and post-realist jurisprudence by demonstrating the potential benefit of scientific methods in
increasing the efficiency of the law in pursuit of its goals.
Michael Perlin's Article parallels that of Wiener in showing the
influence of the "cognitive revolution" in psychology.56 Professor Perlin offers a rich integration of cognitive and social psychology in an
attempt to understand the factors affecting mental health law. His
work fits within the continuing tradition in law and social science of
study of the behavior of judges and other legal decision makers, including the electorate, as an effort to describe the law in action, apart
from the abstract principles on the books.57 Perlin sheds particular
light on the psychological forces that may push jurists toward "irra54. Hans, Attitudes Toward CorporateResponsibility: A PsycholegalPerspective,69
NEB.L. REv. 158 (1990).
55. Wiener, A Psycholegal and EmpiricalApproach to the Medical Standardof Care,
69 NEB. L. REv. 112 (1990).
56. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense"
and HeuristicReasoning, 69 NEB. L. REv. 3 (1990).
57. The discrepancy between legal principles and legal action was an important early

insight of Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910), that
became a core idea in realist jurisprudence. See, eg., Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes
and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 568, 580 (1932)("The
human element in the administration of justice by judges is irrepressible")(emphasis in the original). More recently, analysis of judicial behavior has
been a key feature of economic positivism. See, e.g., W. LADEs & R. POsNER,
THE EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1 (1987)(the fundamental thesis of economic positivism is that "the common law of torts is best explained as if the
judges who created the law through decisions operating as precedents in later
cases were trying to promote efficient resource allocation").
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tional" decisions based on social assumptions directly contrary to empirical research on the insanity defense. In that regard, Perlin's
analysis of the problems that arise for the law when legal standards do
not comport with common moral intuition suggests a useful new direction for psychological-jurisprudential research.
Perlin's work most closely tracks the historic approach of Jerome
Frank.5 8 Perlin goes well beyond the insights of Judge Frank, though,
with careful application of systematic empirical research (instead of
armchair psychoanalysis of judges). In that regard, Perlin's choice of
term ("psychodynamic") to describe his analysis of the role of ordinary common sense in legal decision making is unfortunate, because it
implies psychoanalytic underpinnings that are at most tangential to
the cognitive research that serves as the primary foundation for his
scholarship.
Perlin's work is also well within the social science in law perspective in its acceptance of overarching legal norms (e.g., respect for personal dignity) but its challenge of their application on empirical
grounds. In that regard, Alexander Tanford's work : 9 parallels Perlin's in tone as well as approach. Synthesizing legal rules and psychological research on jury instructions, Professor Tanford presents an
elegant application of jury research and related bodies of knowledge
in cognitive and social psychology. He presents startling, albeit well
validated and to some extent commonsense conclusions that jurors
neither understand nor obey the law and that judicial admonitions
only make things worse. Thus, while showing the necessity of a sophisticated appreciation of the legal process in identifying the implications of empirical research findings (in effect, challenging
psychology), Tanford's primary challenge is to the law itself to develop
procedures and evidentiary rules that better comport with the law's
stated purposes.
Mark Soler 6O and Carole Shauffer also use social science to offer a
challenge to legal policy, 61 although they may not go as far in doing so
as they should have. The framework with which they begin their
analysis is consistent with that employed elsewhere in the Symposium. Showing the problems that have plagued child mental health
policy, they argue for law and policy in which the realities of children's services would comport more closely with de jure values of
child welfare and family integrity.
Mr. Soler and Ms. Shauffer may have given greater credence than
is warranted, though, to coordinationof services. Although coordina58. J. FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).

59. Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions,69 NEB. L. REV. 71 (1990).
60. Soler previously was a visiting professor in the Nebraska Program.
61. Soler & Schauffer, FightingFragmentation: Coordinationof Services for Chil-.
dren and Families,69 NEB. L. REV. 278 (1990).
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tion of planning (as in the Child and Adolescent Service System Program [CASSP], which they discuss) makes sense in a context in which
the various children's service systems have overlapping clientele and
purposes, 6 2 coordination often will be insufficient at the case level.
Outcome research suggests that integrationof services, not mere coordination, is necessary for the multi-problem youth and families who
fill each of the major child service systems (i.e., child welfare, child
mental health, juvenile justice, and special education).63 In most
cases, a single intensive, flexible intervention is needed that incorporates personal, family, school, and community elements. The model of
an hour a week with the psychologist, occasional contacts by the parents with a social worker, and so forth does not work, even if the various professionals do keep in touch with each other. Perhaps this idea
is implied in Soler and Shauffer's point that coordination of ill-conceived programs serves no purpose. Given current funding strictures,
coordination also may be the best that can be done without more fundamental reform. Psycholegal research might be useful in that regard
in evaluating the efficacy of various legal structures that might be
used in the promotion of integrated services for troubled youth and
their families.
In contrast to Tanford and to Soler and Shauffer, Jeffrey Pfeifer, a
PhD-MILS student in the Nebraska Program, challenges psychology.
He offers apt cautions about the limits of social science methods and
the need to base psycholegal research firmly within both a realistic
context and the state of the art in scientific theory and research.6 4 In
its specific content, Mr. Pfeifer's Comment stands in apparent juxtaposition to Professor Tanford's Article, in that Mr. Pfeifer's general
conclusion is that juries may be better decision makers than much of
the psychological literature suggests.
Of course, jurors' limitations in comprehending instructions are of
little import if their intuition about the appropriate standards matches
that of the law. In that regard, as I have noted elsewhere,65 virtually
62. See Melton, Law and Random Events: The State of Child Mental Health Policy,
10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 81 (1987).
63. See generally S. HENGGELER & C. BoRDuIN,. FAMILY THERAPY AND BEYOND: A
MuLTIsYsTEMIc APPROACH TO TREATING THE BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS OF CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS (1990); G. MELTON & D. HARGROVE, PLANNING MENTAL

HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH (forthcoming); Melton, The Jericho

Principle.- Lessons from EpidemiologicalResearch, in SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION
FOR WORKING WITH SERIOUSLY EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN AND ADOLFS.

CENTS (L. Abramczyk ed. 1989).
64. Comment, Reviewing the Evidence on Jury Racism: FindingsofDiscrimination
or DiscriminatoryFindings?,69 NEB. L. REV. 230 (1990)(authored by Jeffrey E.
Pfeifer).
65. Melton, Introduction: The Law and Motivation, in 33 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON
MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUIENT
, xvii-xviii (G. Melton
ed. 1985).
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all jury research has been instrumental in orientation: how well do
juries comprehend instructions, and how well do their decisions match
the decision trees established in the instructions? Jury researchers
might profitably begin to focus more on the symbolic functions of the
jury: what is the meaning of the experience of jury service for jury
members themselves, litigants, and the community as a whole? Such
questions have relevance in the development of law as a system that
enhances sense of community and inculcates community norms.
Like the preceding authors, Alan Tomkins, a faculty member in
the Nebraska Program, examines the instrumentality and rationality
of decision making in a particular legal context (ie., dispositional orders in juvenile courts).66 Although he does conclude that the decisions by juvenile justice professionals generally are based on the
complex factors related to both rehabilitation and punishment that
they purport to be considering. Professor Tomkins's approach is essentially neutral. He does not evaluate whether juvenile justice professionals are making "good" decisions but instead offers a method for
determining the match between de jure and de facto policies in
processing cases. Therefore, as Tomkins points out,67 his method is
potentially applicable as an administrative tool in monitoring whether
the coordinated policies that Soler and Shauffer advocate actually are
implemented among the various actors in the child and family service
system.
The remaining commentaries in the Symposium focus on issues in
mental health law, an area of obvious and continuing concern for
psycholegal scholars. Emily Campbell, a JD-PhD student in the Program, illustrates the sensitivity of contemporary scholars of social science in law to the distinctions between normative and empirical issues
in the law.68 Ms. Campbell's work fits well in that regard with the
prevailing views among psycholegal scholars about the limits of
mental health professionals' expertise in determining criminal responsibility, a question that by its nature is moral and legal but not
69
scientific.
66. Tomkins, DispositionalDecisionmakingin the Juvenile JusticeSystem: An Empirical Study of the Use of Offense and Offender Information, 69 NEB. L. REv.
298 (1990).
67. Id.
68. Comment, The Psychopath and the Definition of "Mental Disease or Defect"
Under the Model Penal Code Test of Insanity: A Question of Psychology or a
Question of Law?, 69 NEB. L. REV. 190 (1990)(authored by Emily Campbell).
69. See generally G. MELTON, J. PETRiLA, N. POYTBRESS & C. SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFES-

SIONALS AND LAWYERS (1987); Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66
VA. L. REV. 427 (1980); Morse, Crazy Behavior,Morals,and Science: An Analysis
of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978); Morse, FailedExplanations
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James Ogloff (a J.D.-Ph.D. graduate of the Program), David
Finkelman (a former post-doctoral fellow in the Program), Randy
Otto (also a former post-doctoral fellow, who obtained an M.L.S. degree in the Program), and Denise Bulling (a mental health professional in Lincoln) describe the implementation of a Nebraska statute
designed to reduce the abominable practice of jailing non-criminal individuals with acute mental disorders as a means of warehousing them
until they can be hospitalized. 70 Ogloff and his colleagues show that
the provision of a crisis center not only has resulted in its intended
benefit but that it also has had the positive side effect of avoiding a
substantial number of unnecessary civil commitments. 71 In that regard, this Article stands in contrast to Christopher Slobogin's 72 provocative but, in my opinion, conceptually and empirically flawed
attack on the community-first principle.73 Jillane Hinds finds a midand CriminalResponsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REv. 971

(1982).
70. Ogloff, Finkelman, Otto & Bulling, Preventing the Detention of Non-criminal
Mentally Ill People in Jails: The Need for Emergency ProtectiveCustody Units,
69 NEB. L. REv. 433 (1990).
71. Ogloff et al.'s
approach is consistent with the developing ethos in mental health
policy in which the historic ideological conflict between "legal" and "medical"
models is deemphasized in favor of a focus on development of pragmatic policies
that produce humane and respectful responses to people with mental disabilities.
See generally Wexler & Schopp, TherapeuticJurisprudence:A New Approach to
Mental Health Law, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw (D. Kagehiro & W.
Laufer eds. forthcoming)(chapter co-authored by a faculty member in the Nebraska Program in a volume co-edited by a former post-doctoral fellow in the
Nebraska Program).
72. Slobogin, Treatment of the Mentally Disabled-Rethinking the Community-First
Idea, 69 NEB. L. REV. 413 (1990). Professor Slobogin is a former visiting professor
in the Nebraska Program. He also is an ongoing collaborator in my own work
related to mental health law. E.g., G. MELTON, J. PETRiLA, N. PoYrHREss & C.
SLOBOGI, supra note 69; G. MELTON, L. WErTHORN & C. SLOBOGIN, COMMuNrrY
MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND THE COURTS: AN EVALUATION OF COM,1UNYBASED FoRENsIc SERVicEs (1985).

73. A full rebuttal to Professor Slobogin's argument would go well beyond the scope
of this Introduction. However, his commentary is based on an incomplete review
of the relevant empirical research. With no stated justification, Slobogin also
reverses the prevailing presumptions in law and philosophy requiring that the
state demonstrate a compelling justification for deprivation of fundamental rights
and discrimination on the basis of status. In fact, as he tacitly acknowledges, no
studies have shown superiority of hospital-based treatment, a remarkable fact in
a society that ostensibly reveres freedom and equality as primary values but that
nonetheless persists in subjecting people with mental disabilities to unduly restrictive, intrusive, and expensive services that are without documented efficacy.
Indeed, a much stronger argument can be made for abolition of civil commitment
than for diminution of substantive due process rights of people with mental disabilities. See generally C. KIESLER & A. SmULKIN, MENTAL HOSPrrALiZATION:
MYTHs AND FAcTs ABOUT A NATIONAL CRisis (1987); Melton & Garrison, Fear,
Prejudice, and Neglect DiscriminationAgainst Mentally DisabledPersons, 42
Axi. PsYcHOLOGIST 1007 (1987); Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case
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dle ground in which she urges caution in deprivation of liberty, even
on an outpatient basis, but in which she argues that outpatient commitment sometimes prevents greater restrictions on liberty.74
The content of the Symposium is diverse, and the views expressed
within it are sometimes in conflict. Nonetheless, without exception,
the authors have adopted original approaches to important problems
of legal regulation of human behavior.
IV.

CONCLUSION: JUSTICE BLACKMUN AS A MODEL

The potential utility of the social science in law perspective for judicial decision making and the perspective's normative underpinnings
can also be illustrated by leaving the Nebraska example for a moment
and examining the work of a familiar jurist, Justice Harry Blackmun.
At its biennial meeting in 1990, AP-LS gave Justice Blackmun its
award for distinguished contributions to psychology and law. The introductory remarks and award citation by Thomas Grisso, then president of AP-LS, focused on the ways that Justice Blackmun was a
kindred spirit to the academicians, forensic clinicians, and policymakers who compose AP-LS's membership. 75 In so doing, Professor
Grisso not only provided a moving account of the contributions that
Justice Blackmun has made to the nation but also a concise statement
of the values that are embedded in psychological jurisprudence and
social science in law, a point on which I will elaborate.
Justice Blackmun's approach to his work, especially in recent
years, has been marked by two themes that at first glance may appear
paradoxical. On the one hand, Justice Blackmun has been the
Supreme Court's scientist, carefully seeking and applying empirical
evidence in a rational, pragmatic approach to the Court's policymaking role. 7 6 Presumably relying on his undergraduate education as a
Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered,70 CALIF. L. REv.
54 (1982). That judges, legislators, and mental health administrators rarely have
taken the community-first principle seriously is not reason to abandon it; rather,
the principle should be strengthened with sufficient attention to procedures for
implementation to give it practical meaning. Nonetheless, Slobogin's point that
positive effects of tacit commitment to the community-first principle should not
be presumed without empirical evidence is well taken and within the spirit of this

Symposium.
74. Hinds, Involuntary OutpatientCommitmentfor the ChronicallyMentally Ill, 69
NEB. L. REv. 346 (1990). Ms. Hinds is a J.D.-M.A. graduate of the Nebraska
Program.
75. T. Grisso, Introduction to Invited Address by J. Blackmun to the American Psychology-Law Society, Williamsburg, Va. (Mar. 16, 1990) [hereinafter T. Grisso, Introduction]; T. Grisso, Remarks on the Presentation of the American PsychologyLaw Society Award for Distinguished Contributions to Psychology and Law to J.
Blackmun, Williamsburg, Va. (Mar. 16, 1990) [hereinafter T. Grisso, Remarks].
76. In his own largely extemporaneous address to AP-LS, Justice Blackmun made
clear the value that he places on briefs submitted by APA and other amici curiae
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mathematics major at Harvard and his experience as counsel to the
Mayo Clinic, Justice Blackmun has cited empirical evidence in more
than 300 cases, an unprecedented level of attention to social facts.77
He also was the author of the first Supreme Court opinion heavily
relying on social science evidence, 78 evidence that was developed
through judicial notice without presentation by the litigants either at
trial or in briefs.79
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun has been the Court's moral
authority, not just its empirical authority. His opinions have been notable as much for their passion as their recitation of statistics. He has
been a voice for the inarticulate and the powerless in numerous legal
contexts,s0 and his humility has been matched by his outrage at the
Court's increasing insensitivity and inflexibility in the face of injustice
and tragedy.S1 I know of no judicial opinion more anguished or more
powerful than Justice Blackmun's brief dissent from the Court's failure to see a violation of fundamental rights when the state has knowwho present scientific evidence for the Court's consideration. He at least implicitly invited still greater involvement in the Court by the two APAs (the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association), who he
indicated were among the most persuasive groups to come before the Court. Just
prior to the AP-LS meeting, Justice Blackmun had penned a brief concurring
opinion in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990), in which he had indicated
his consternation in weighing the competing scientific arguments by the two
APAs on the question of the effects of antipsychotic medication.
For a detailed discussion of Justice Blackmun's empiricism, see Schlesinger &

Nesse, JusticeHarryBlackmun and EmpiricalJurisprudence,29 AM. U.L. REv.
405 (1980).
77. T. Grisso, Introduction, supra note 74, at 3. The remarkable quantity and quality
of Justice Blackmun's consideration of empirical evidence can best be appreciated
by examination of the records of other 20th-century judges. See P. RosEN, THE
SuPREME COURT AND SocIAL ScIENcE 212-17 (1972) and citations therein;
Hafemeister & Melton, The Impact of Social Science Research on the Judiciary,
in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHmLD DEVELOPMENT REsEARCH

(G. Melton

ed. 1987). See also A. Brown, The Utilization of Social Science Research by the

Judiciary A Quantitative Analysis of Obscenity Opinions (1989); P. Falk, Courts'
Citation and Reference to Social Science in Legal Opinions Involving Gay Individuals (1988); and T. Hafemeister, The Impact of Social Science Materials on the

Judiciary: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis (1988)(doctoral dissertations
in the Law/Psychology Program, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, in which quantitative and qualitative analyses have been undertaken of courts' use of social
science).
78. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
79. J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOcL

SCIENE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 488

(1st ed. 1985).
80. T. Grisso, Introduction, supra note 74, at 2 (citing Koh, Equality with a Human
Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal ProtectionofAliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV.
51 (1985)).
81. See, eg., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067
(1989)(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ingly permitted a child to be subjected to a life-threatening (and
ultimately disabling) living situation:82
Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the law, un-

moved by "natural sympathy." But, in this pretense, the Court itself retreats
into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of
the case before it or the legal norms that should apply to those facts....
Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves, the Court
today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled by existing legal
doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by this case is an open one,
and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or
narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with the
choice, I would adopt a "sympathetic" reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be ex-

iled from the province of judging....
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him
in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and
yet did essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, "dutifully recorded these incidents in [their) files." It is a sad commentary upon
American life, and constitutional principles-so full of patriotic fervor and
proud proclamations about "liberty and justice for all," that this child, Joshua
DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly
retarded. Joshua and his mother . ..deserve-but now are denied by this
Court-the opportunity to have the facts of their case considered in the light
of the constitutional protection that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is meant to provide.8 3

Poor Joshua! In that phrase lies the clue to the resolution of the
paradox. Just as the sociological jurisprudes and the realists sought to
foster sensitivity by the law to individual circumstances 8 4-- to human
dilemmas--Justice Blackmun strives to sustain a legal system respectful of the dignity of the individual, no matter how disadvantaged his or
her station in life. That is a grand and noble purpose-a purpose demanding passion. At the same time, if people are to be taken seriously
(perhaps the essence of respect for dignity), legal decision makers
should consider the best available evidence about the social realities in
which litigants (and those whose lives will be shaped by litigation in
which they are not parties) find themselves. In short, Justice Blackmun has recognized that a legal system that takes individuals seriously and that builds and sustains a sense of community requires both
moral fervor and good data.
As Professor Grisso stated more succinctly, "What we can see is his
[Justice Blackmun's] recognition that scientific fact can often provide
a necessary real-world context with which a considered interpretation
of the Constitution should have to struggle."8 5 It is that perception
that drives contemporary psycholegal scholarship-a worldview not
82. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1012 (1989).

83. Id at 1012-13.
84. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Some Realism aboutRealism Responding to DeanPound, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1222 (1931); Pound, supra note 12, at 710.
85. T. Grisso, Introduction, supra note 74, at 4.
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far from that adopted by Dean Pound at Nebraska nearly a century
ago. Today, though, we have the benefit of more valid scientific methods and better developed ideas about the legal and moral requisites of
personhood.
That is a heady perspective from which to view legal problems. It
offers challenges to jurists to look carefully at the experience that citizens have of the law and to evaluate whether the law is meeting its
grander aims, whether in the resolution of tragic dilemmas or in the
enhancement of everyday life. At the same time, it requires psychologists of law to expand their work to ask questions that are likely to
yield answers informative to those who seek a humanistic legal system
capable of guiding the community and enhancing dignity.
Both disciplines and the interdisciplinary enterprise that they have
spawned still have far to go before their potential is realized, but I
suspect that this Symposium will be viewed ultimately as a significant
step in the right direction.
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APPENDIX A
Presentations by UNL Faculty, Fellows, Students, and Graduates at the
1990 Meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society
M. Aubrey & J. Ogloff, Survey of Forensic Training in APA
Internships
K. Boucher, Factors Affecting the Use of Social Scientific and Statistical Evidence in Discrimination Cases
K. Boucher, R. Macolini, & R. Thompson, Rights of Unwed Fathers
J. Greenwald, A. Tonikins, & M. Kenning, Psychological Self-Defense:
Verdicts for Battered Women Defendants
T. Hafemeister & P. Falk, Impact of Social Science Materials on the
Judiciary
S. Limber, G. Melton, & S. Rahe, Legal Knowledge, Attitudes, and
Legal Reasoning Abilities of Child Witnesses
G. Melton, Psychological Jurisprudence in the Context of the Law and
Society Movement
K. Moore & M. Small, Problem Solving Skills of Adolescent Inpatients: Implications for Civil Commitment of Minors
J. Moreland, Behavior of American Indian Law
V. Murphy-Berman & J. Berman, Attitudes About AIDS: Comparisons of Students from Law and Psychology
J. Ogloff, Community Health Centers to Provide Services to Local
Jails
R. Peters & R. Otto, The Florida Forensic Evaluator Training
Program
J. Rothweiler & R. Wiener, Psychological Testing and Test Bias in the
Assessment of Black and White Populations
M. Scalora, R. Thompson, S. Limber & L. Castrianno, Grandparent
Visitation Rights
M. Steward & D. Steward, Comparison of Traditional and ComputerAssisted Interviews with Young Children
D. Wolfe & R. Macolini, Juror Comprehension in Complex Cases: An
Examination of Juror Notetaking and the Insanity Defense
D. Wolfe, A. Tomkins, K. Olson, et al., Out-of-Home Placements for
Juveniles: Empirical and Policy Issues and the Use of Focus Groups
for Data Acquisition
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Doctoral Dissertations in the Law/Psychology Program, 1979-89 Robinsue
Frohboese, Parental Opposition to Deinstitutionalization: A
Challenge in Need of Attention and Resolution (1979)
Thomas D. Overcast, The Development and Evaluation of Handbooks
Providing Law Related Information for the Elderly (1980)
David L. Suggs, A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of the Impact
of Nebraska's Decriminalization of Marijuana (1980)
H. Roberts O'Neal, Communication Across Cultures: American Subcultures and the Culture of the School (1982)
Ruth A. Parvin, Long-term Effects of Sexual Assaults (1982)
James D. Herbsleb, Application of Attribution Theory to Judgments
of Credibility (1984)
Kent A. Wilson, Retribution, Public Opinion, and Criminal Sentencing (1984)
Roberta A. Morris, Methods in Psycholegal Research (1987)
W. LeAnn Wallace, The Community Penalties Act of 1983: An Evaluation of the Law, Its Implementation, and Its Impact in North Carolina (1987)
Linda Whobrey Rohman, The Nebraska Prehearing Settlement Conference Program: An Experimental Evaluation (1987)
Patricia J. Falk, Courts' Citation and Reference to Social Science in
Legal Opinions Involving Gay Individuals (1988)
Thomas L. Hafemeister, The Impact of Social Science Materials on the
Judiciary: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis (1988)
Glen D. Skoler, Saviours of the Nation, Assassins of the Self: Psychodynamic Characteristics of Presidential Threateners and Other Secret Service Cases (1988)
Allen J. Brown, The Utilization of Social Science Research by the Judiciary: A Quantitative Analysis of Obscenity Opinions (1989)
Mario J. Scalora, Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders: A Comparison
with Other Sex Offenders on Clinical and Legal Factors (1989)
Mark B. DeKxaai, Impact of Litigation on Developmental Disabilities
Services (1990)
Lois Oberlander, Cognitive Processes and Clinical Decision Making
Patterns Among Mental Health Professionals: An Empirical Demonstration (1990)
James R. P. Ogloff, A Comparison of the Impact of Insanity Defense
Standards on Juror Decision-Making (1990)
A. Jocelyn Ritchie, Effects of Ethanol on Developing Organisms
(1990)
Mark Small, The Role of Perceptions of Privacy Invasions in a Psychology of Jurisprudence (1990)
Daniel Wolfe, Juror Comprehension in Complex Cases: An Examination of Juror Notetaking and the Insanity Defense (1990)

